

Civil War Legacies on Contemporary Voting Patterns: The Divergent Paths of the Left and the Right in Peru

Abstract

This paper investigates whether the Peruvian conflict between Shining Path and the security forces during the 1980s influences contemporary electoral outcomes. I test broadly assumed arguments about the positive impact of the war on the rightwing fujimorista political movement and its negative impact on leftwing support by exploiting an original dataset at the district level with vote shares for the three major contenders during the first round of the 2016 presidential election. My findings show that even controlling for contemporary factors, fujimorismo does better in districts more affected by the civil war. The leftwing Frente Amplio fared better in districts with high levels of prewar marginalization, and in those where state repression was higher on average. These results point to a victimization-driven legacy of civil war on electoral outcomes.

Wordcount: 10,185 words

Introduction

This paper looks at the impact of past political violence in contemporary political outcomes. It empirically investigates whether the Peruvian conflict between Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, henceforth SP or Sendero) and the security forces during the 1980s does have an apparent effect on two standard features of the political system in Peru: the strength of the rightwing fujimorismo, as well as the weakness of the leftwing parties.

As the canonical argument goes, Alberto Fujimori's success in defeating Sendero and moving the country out of a devastating economic crisis helped him cement a new authoritarian-prone constituency which is today the base of Alberto's daughter movement – Fuerza Popular (also known as the party of the K, being K a short for Keiko, Alberto Fujimori's daughter's name). The other side of the argument states that the failure of the Left to carve its own path in-between the bloody revolutionary choice offered by Sendero, on the one hand, and the incapacity of the centrist government to steer state-driven economic growth, on the other, turned the Left unable to adapt to the new political realities of the 1990s: militarization, economic informality, and authoritarianism. In this story, Sendero dug the grave, and Fujimori just threw the body into it (Adrianzén 2011; see also the collection of essays in Soifer and Vergara 2019 for more nuanced interpretations of the impact of the conflict on contemporary Peruvian politics).

What I do in this paper is to bring these broadly assumed arguments to the empirical fore. I have built an original dataset at the district level with presidential vote shares for the three major contenders during the first round of the 2016 presidential election in Peru and coupled these numbers with different potentially explanatory factors.

First, I include a bunch of contemporary factors which could drive vote support – such as crime and poverty rates. Second, I discuss several prewar factors that may influence ideological voting, such as the spread of land reform in the district, the electoral support for the centrist APRA party, and the percentage of Spanish speakers in the district as of the 1980 Census. Finally, I consider some indicators of the internal conflict, such as rebel violence against civilians and state repression in the district, and the number of years a district remained under rebel or contested control during the conflict. In order to measure

control, I use the capacity of Sendero to boycott the municipal elections as a good indicator of rebel presence.

I run OLS models for the three largest parties in the first round of the 2016 Presidential election. The first party is the Fujimori's successor movement, now called *Fuerza Popular* (Popular Force) and headed with an iron fist by Keiko Fujimori. The party got 40 percent in the first round. Second finished Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (widely known as PPK) with 21 percent of the vote -- his party being named *Peruanos Por el Kambio* (Peruvians for Change), just a word game to pick an acronym whose three letters overlap with the candidate's initials. Verónica Mendoza, frontrunner of the leftwing platform *Frente Amplio* (FA, Broad Front) ended in the third position, with a surprisingly high 19 percent. Keiko and PPK moved to the balloting and the latter claimed the presidency by less than half a percentage point.

My findings show that the common wisdom is partially correct. Contemporarily, fujimorismo thrives in more affluent districts and slightly more affected by crime. These are districts with more Spanish speakers than average. But at the same time, the civil war winner's effect is crystal-clear. Keiko collected more votes in districts with more rebel killings, and in districts where the rebels had a stronger presence.

The leftwing Frente Amplio shows a different pattern. After two decades of electoral oblivion, the Left was able to build a large electoral front with a likeable candidate. The effort paid off and the party finished in a very decent third position, ahead of a crowded field of seven other minor candidates who polled around 20 percent together. The illusion of unity, however, did not last much and the Left is back to purges and party splintering.

Nonetheless, my analysis here tries to estimate how much of the leftwing surge was driven by contemporary issues, such as poverty and crime, and how much by a legacy of the conflict. The results show this dual nature of the FA support. On the one hand, FA fared very well in districts with high levels of poverty and marginalization (as measured by the 1980 level of Spanish speakers). But at the same time, FA also performed nicely in districts where state repression was higher on average. Although the dynamics of violence do not seem to have an impact on their own, I find that, when interacted with poverty, districts with some amount of rebel control have a five-percent leftwing edge compared to safe and

contested districts when poverty moves to its higher values. This result, however, is not robust to a number of matching tests. It would seem that the Left in Peru is very dependent on historically marginalized areas where the state is very weak and organizational barriers to political mobilization are still high.

Finally, PPK represents a more standard rightwing constituency, with higher-than-average support in affluent, Spanish-speaking, and larger districts. Congruent with the technocratic image of the candidate, and his self-cultivated aloofness from the electorate, PPK voting shows little connection with the civil war indicators, a testament to the precariousness of his shortlived presidency.

I use survey data to double-check the robustness of these findings. I focus on small towns, as these were the breeding ground and the main locus of the civil war. Broadly speaking, the results hold, with Keiko's voters in small towns showing a larger propensity to complain about crime, being more reliant on the military forces, and less willing to identify themselves as indigenous; In contrast, Verónica Mendoza attracts more small-town voters with past experiences of discrimination, who tend to identify themselves as indigenous and show little trust in the armed forces. All this points to conflict legacies channeling past victimization experiences into party preferences.

In the rest of the paper, I first discuss how legacies can affect contemporary outcomes in the light of the existing research. I then move to contextualize the Peruvian case, with a brief description of the conflict and the 2016 election. The next section describes the data and the results. A final section discusses individual mechanisms and concludes.

Reviewing theoretical expectations

Literature on the connection between violence and elections has by and large focused on two main avenues of research. On the one hand, there is a well-established field of mostly empirical analyses that look at contemporary relationships between violence and electoral returns. Seminal papers focused on riots and elections in India (Varshney 2002; Wilkinson 2004) and the impact of the Palestinian conflict on Israeli elections (Berrebi and Klor 2006, 2008). These studies tried to find out whether violence moved voters towards a more hawkish stance and therefore it gave politicians incentives to electorally exploit conflicts to

their advantage. A more recent stream of papers broadened the field by focusing on countries affected by terrorism such as Turkey (Kibris 2011), Colombia (García 2009), and Spain (De la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca 2013, Falcó, Muñoz & Pannico 2018) and more generally on riot-prone countries in Africa (Bekoe 2012, Travagianti 2014). A final avenue within this subfield is the study of how criminal violence does impact on political outcomes in countries heavily affected by internal gangs – see for instance Bateson (2012) on Guatemala and Ley (2018) on Mexico.

A typical finding of this literature would be that the closer the impact of the violent events to the election, the more easily their benefits will be politically reaped by parties supporting iron-fist approaches to the conflict – driven either by vote swinging or lower turnout. That said, this finding becomes more nuanced once we start considering longer time frames.

Enter the second avenue of research for the link between violence and electoral outcomes. There is a short but nonetheless growing literature on the role that conflicts of the past play in contemporary politics. Long-term legacies have always been a darling of political sociology, with the Weberian theory of Protestantism and economic growth being a prototypical example. But perhaps the recent takeoff of this approach was starred by Jason Wittenberg's *Crucibles of Political Loyalty* (2006), where the author asks how it happened that after four decades of communist rule, religious identities were back in the ballot box and made up the winning constituency. For Wittenberg, the strong correlation between right-wing party voting in 1948 and 1989 was driven by mechanisms of religious resilience linked to the persistent presence of local charters of the Christian churches that successfully resisted communist efforts to secularize the population.

Although violence was not in Wittenberg's equation, many papers flourished afterwards investigating the resilience of electoral patterns over time and how different “shadows of the past” and “legacies” were responsible for this persistence (see for instance Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017 for a general overview on legacies of communism). For those focused on the legacies of violence, there are two main angles to the topic: from the standpoint of the victims, and from the standpoint of the perpetrators of violence.

Recent literature on legacies of violence has highlighted the effect of victimization on electoral loyalties. Thus, Balcells (2012) finds that experiences of victimization occurred

during the civil war or the dictatorship in Spain move citizens against supporting parties that remain close to the perpetrators, even if those experiences were intergenerationally transmitted rather than first-hand. In a similar vein, Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) and Rozenas et al. (2017) also find that traumatic events of harsh repression (such as deportation) during the Stalinist period still prompt current individual attitudes against the perpetrators in some areas of Ukraine. Again the argument is about how rejection of the perpetrator is transmitted through generations.

In a more fine-grained analysis, Villamil (2018) claims that the intergenerational mechanism is conditional on the existence of local networks that maintain memories of the violence and have them ready for political activation and mobilization. Hadzic, Carlson, and Tavits (2017) find that war victimization helps cement in-group ethnic loyalty (and outgroup suspicion), and this was a vehicle for the consolidation of ethnic voting in postwar Bosnia.

On the other hand, there is also a literature showing that perpetrators can trigger violence to build an enduring support constituency. For instance, De la Calle (2015a) found that electoral patterns in the Basque Country and Catalonia remained surprisingly similar before and after the 40-year-old dictatorship with the only exception of some areas in the Basque Country, where most votes had moved from prewar non-nationalist loyalty to staunch support for secession even through violent means. In his account, violence helped galvanize a new nationalist movement that was more radical in its means and goals. In the absence of violence, this constituency may have evolved towards a more accommodating wing of Basque nationalism, but terrorism and state repression altered its course and threw its members into a more radical, violence-driven path. In this sense, contemporary politics in the Basque Country cannot be understood without this legacy of violence that is still visible, even years after the end of violence in the region.

Similarly, Allison (2010), in his study of the electoral performance of the FMLN in El Salvador in 1994, just in the aftermath of the end of its protracted civil war, finds that violence largely changed the course of political loyalties in the country. Allison's analysis shows that the FMLN performed better not only in municipalities wherein the rebel group

had been in control during the civil war, but also in municipalities that experienced the conflict at large.

Costalli and Ruggeri (2015), in turn, highlight both the role of partisan mobilization during World War II in Italy and Nazi victimization on electoral outcomes in the aftermath of the conflict. They found a strong effect of partisan mobilization over voting for ideologically radical options (such as the Communist Party), as well as a minor effect of Nazi repression over the same outcome. The hypothesized mechanism for the stronger effect refers to a transfer of partisans into political activists and cadres working for the new parties. This effect endures over time through the consolidation of postwar party strongholds in areas where partisans successfully operated (Costalli and Ruggeri 2018).

Regarding time horizons, research on legacies has moved between short-term effects and long-term influence of war on electoral outcomes. Some authors, like Allison, and Costalli and Ruggeri (in their 2015 article) look at a very short-term legacy impact: for the Salvadorian case, the war ended in 1992 and the election under analysis was held in 1994, whereas for the Italian case, the war ended in 1945 and the constitutional election was held the next year (see also Weintraub, Vargas and Flores 2015 for a similar short-term impact analysis of rebel violence in Colombia for the 2014 presidential election). Others, on the other hand, consider much larger time frames of influence – such as the impact of the Spanish civil war over voting returns four decades later.

Interestingly, my study lies in the middle: although Sendero Luminoso had largely been rooted out by 1995, two decades later, in 2016, many victims (and perpetrators) were still around. A similar time frame is used by Costalli and Ruggeri (2018), but unlike their Italian study, where rebels won the conflict and had resources to build a powerful party platform, Sendero in Peru was fully defeated and has been banished from (and has avoided) participating in the electoral game, which makes the connection between legacies and politics more uncertain, and yet original.

I conclude this section with a couple of expectations that come out from the reviewed literature. First, I expect that districts where rebel violence outperformed state repression will show a larger propensity to vote for right-wing candidates (and more specifically, for the Fujimori movement, because it was the one to take credit for trashing Sendero),

whereas districts with the opposite outcome (more state repression) will have more affinity for leftwing candidates. And second, in line with the aforementioned research emphasizing that previous rebel presence helps build links to contemporary leftwing movements willing to reap the long-term investment, I expect a positive correlation between rebel presence during the civil war and leftwing voting in 2016.

In what follows I briefly sketch the context of the civil war and how parties collapsed in its aftermath.

The conflict

The Peruvian Civil War started on 17 May 1980, when several SP cadres broke the ballot boxes in Chuschi – a small town in Cangallo, in central Ayacucho. Despite the perennial Latin American fixation with using violence to solve socioeconomic problems, the Peruvian war featured two unlikely characteristics that placed it beyond that trend: First, the start of rebel violence was deliberately scheduled for the date the country officially transitioned into a democracy, with the presidential election of 1980, after twelve years of a sort of leftwing military dictatorship. Thus, rebels took advantage of milder repression and coordination issues within the incoming institutions to quickly gain a foothold in the countryside.

And secondly, unlike many other leftwing rebel groups in the region, more focused on a Cuban-backed Leninist approach to rebellion, Sendero Luminoso heavily drew on Maoism as its main ideological doctrine. With one strategic innovation, though: Abimael Guzmán (aka *Comrade Gonzalo*), the long-serving leader of the rebel group, put his footprint on Maoist thinking by suggesting that instead of fighting for control in the countryside and move forward to the cities after seizing rural territory, Sendero should operate in the two theaters at the same time. The conclusion is that the conflict had to be felt not only in the rural backwaters of the country, but also in Metropolitan Lima, site of one third of the country population (De la Calle 2017).

During the 1970s, SP was concentrated on doing militant proselytism within the indigenous communities of the Sierra. Thus, it took advantage not only of decades of political and economic exclusion, but also of the failed efforts during the military government to

distribute land, mobilize laborers and, more generally, redress the political and economic grievances of these peoples (CVR 2003: vol. VIII; Koc-Menard 2007). It is no surprise then that violence initially spread quickly in the Andean triangle (Huancavelica–Ayacucho–Apurímac), with the region of Northern Ayacucho serving as SP's stronghold (Degregori 1986).

Fernando Belaúnde, the last democratically-elected president before the military coup in 1968, also won the 1980 presidential election. Very reluctant for obvious reasons to grant special powers to the army for dealing with the new rebel threat, he largely stood aside and relied on the police forces. This was a disastrous decision, since the police, poorly-equipped and underfunded, short on morale, were quickly overran by Sendero mobile and better-trained units (Gorriti 1990). When, in 1982, the army was called in, its tactics of indiscriminate repression further jeopardised the low levels of state legitimacy in the area (McClintock 1998). SP also took savage measures against local populations that stood up against its rule, as testified by the Lucanamarca massacre, in which SP guerrillas slaughtered sixty-nine farmers in reaction to the killing of two local SP cadres by local dwellers.

From the very beginning, Sendero was also able to recruit in Metropolitan Lima many youngsters disappointed with the lack of opportunities and secular racial discrimination of the politico-economic establishment (Chávez 1989, 26). Taking advantage of the growing number of immigrants coming to Lima, and the creation of new shantytowns, SP set up urban commandos that carried out a permanent terrorist campaign against politicians and security forces in the safest areas of the country (Burt 1998).

After the Christian-democratic tenure of Belaúnde, a more leftwing Alan García took over in 1985. His term also started with some distance from the military by emphasizing poverty alleviation policies and human-rights concerns regarding state repression as best strategies to attenuate political violence. But García very quickly changed course and gave the army full powers to deal with the rebellion, as the government brought a large number of provinces under emergency law, provoked several massacres of imprisoned Sendero leaders and sponsored the setup of paramilitary commandos which started to target civic leaders of the leftwing movement (Palmer 1995).

Poorly-armed, SP was broadly damaged by the introduction of self-defense militias in rural areas (Degregori 1998; Starn 1998). As a way of deviating the attention from its growing problems in the heartland of the conflict, Sendero launched the so-called 'final offensive', intended to encircle Lima and force the downfall of the capital by cutting all supply lines from the countryside. This initiative overlapped with the collapse of the economy. After two years of moderate successes, García's reluctance to pay back to bondholders, plus price-controlled policies triggered an inflation spiral that virtually destroyed most of the formal sector of the economy. This destruction affected the political system too, and in 1990 the two main frontrunners – Nobel-winner Mario Vargas Llosa from the right and a little known engineer named Alberto Fujimori from the center-Left -- were no longer members of the three main parties that had sustained the democratic edifice since 1980: García's center-Left Partido Aprista, Belaúnde's Christian-democrat Acción Popular (Popular Action), and the leftwing Izquierda Unida (United Left).

Fujimori's victory in the second round of the 1990 presidential election initially contributed to the apparent incapacity of the regime to bring the rebellion to a halt. Despite being losing ground in the countryside, outgunned by the self-defence militias, Sendero showed muscle in its daily operations in Lima. By far short of a majority in the legislative chambers, Fujimori found his policies to stop Sendero struck down by Courts and Congress. This stalemate ended with Fujimori's *autogolpe*. On 5 April 1992, Fujimori dissolved Congress and empowered the military with all the resources needed to quash SP, little respect for human rights included. A few months later, the carefully planned arrest, in Lima, of Abimael Guzmán – the quasi-mythical leader of the group – gave Fujimori a tremendous success and great popularity. On top of that, Guzmán's arrest had dramatic effects on the morale of the SP militants, and many put down weapons and took recourse to the repentance law passed in 1992 (Bermúdez 1995). Guzman's later call for surrender simply copper-fastened the process. By the end of 1993, only one year after the fall of Guzmán, SP was more or less finished.

Between SP, state repression, and the actions of minor groups, such as the MRTA, and the far-right Rodrigo Franco Commandos, the war claimed 69,000 victims. Most of the violence was concentrated around the central Sierra region, with Ayacucho, Huancavelica

and Apurímac as the deadliest departments, as well as the dangerous Huallaga corridor in Huánuco. Although much below in numbers, Metropolitan Lima also bore a traumatic experience of the conflict.

Party politics in Peru

Contemporary politics in Peru is identified by three main features. First, the relatively recent experience of the Fujimorato, a decade-long electoral authoritarian regime led by Alberto Fujimori that put the foundations for the current institutional setup. Although elected in a sort of centrist-Left platform in 1990, Fujimori very quickly switched to the right and adopted the economic neoliberal program defended by his defeated rival, Mario Vargas Llosa (Stokes 2001). His economic policies moved the country out of collapse and put it into a track of strong, sustained growth. In turn, his counter-insurgent policies, although very controversial, also achieved the surprisingly quick defeat of Sendero.

This successful legacy, even if not enough to avoid Fujimori's fall in 2000 and further imprisonment in 2007, allowed his economic policies and political institutions to keep running the country. As a matter of fact, although all presidents from 2000 (with the only exception of PPK in 2016) ran on centrist-Left platforms standing for more redistribution and less commodity extraction, as soon as sworn into office, they changed course, bought the whole neoliberal playbook, and ended up sustaining the same institutions Fujimori put in place (Dargent and Muñoz 2016). In addition to this fatal lack of responsiveness, the last four previous presidents have been indicted or accused of corruption crimes related to the Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht, which adds to voters' disaffection with the party system (Seawright 2012). Quite strikingly though, a sizeable number of voters remain loyal to fujimorismo, despite his record of human rights violations and generalized graft during his decade-long presidency.

A second feature of the Peruvian political landscape is the existence of electoral coalitions that rarely survive beyond Election day, and that have consistently failed to become transformed into stable, card-holding parties with large territorial presence (Levitsky 2018). The neoliberal turn manufactured by Alberto Fujimori in the early 1990s did no doubt help increase the weakness of Peruvian political parties, but this feature was also present during the 1980s, when parties in government succumbed to the so-called incumbency

disadvantage (Klašnja, 2015) and ended up incapable of fielding attractive candidates for the next election. Given this apparent disconnection between policy outcomes and presidential approval ratings, it is no surprise that every election cycle opens with full uncertainty about who the main contenders will be – with the only exception of Keiko Fujimori, who has passed to the ballotage in the last two presidential elections (but it is very uncertain now if she will be able to run again in 2021, given her current imprisonment). Thus, lack of strong parties makes Peru a country with a low reputation of having ideological voting, although polarization has slightly been in the rise over the 2000s (Singer 2016). In this sense, Peru may look like an improbable contender for identifying party strongholds, as the country is one of the paradigmatic instances of democracy without parties (Levitsky 2018).

The final feature of Peruvian politics is the downfall of the leftwing movement during the early 1990s. The leftwing movement was slow to organize during the first half of the 20th century, but it quickly caught up during the revolutionary government of Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975). The contradictions of the military regime opened the door for large-scale mobilization, as the regime encouraged unionization and mobilization, but at the same time without counting on the necessary economic resources to satisfy the growing list of citizens' demands. The combination of easy participation, with low repression, and economic crisis fueled the dramatic expansion of leftwing groups. When the military leadership called for an Assembly to write a new democratic constitution, many were surprised by the 30 percent of votes that the different leftwing lists gathered (Huber 1983).

The 1980s were the years of electoral success for Izquierda Unida, which for instance took over the mayor's office in Lima in 1983, but also sew the roots of failure. There were three trends that jeopardized the potential of growth for the IU: violence, economic crisis and infighting (Adrianzén 2011; Roberts 1998, chapter 8; Stokes 1995). Violence was always an issue for the electoral Left, because it cost it dearly not to clearly and unapologetically condemn Sendero's attacks. For a sizeable section of IU's activists, it was not possible to renounce to the revolutionary (and potentially violent) path and any denunciation of Sendero's violence should go hand in hand with the rejection of state repression. These

nuanced stances, even if not majoritarian within the coalition, repelled many middle-class citizens from casting a ballot for the Left.

The second problem was that the main vehicles of leftwing mobilization had been unions and cadre-based parties. When the economic crisis of the second half of the 1980s started to kick in, the formalized economy shrank and most workers were forced to survive in the informal sector, where unionization is absent and collective action is much of an illusion. The process of deindustrialization turned professionalized leftwing parties unable to cater to their potential constituencies.

The final problem that contributed to triggering the marginalization of leftwing politics in Peru was the inherent tendency of leftwing currents to fight with each other before the collapse of the Soviet Union. The IU hosted an uneasy coalition of Marxist tribes, going all the way from Maoism to social-democracy European style. In the eve of the 1990 presidential election, some moderates within IU thought that the coalition had to become organizationally stronger by offering a more concise political program, getting rid of revolutionary dreams and fully supporting counterinsurgent forces in the fight against Sendero. But most party leaders did not agree with this view and the moderates walked out of the IU convention to create a new party. The 1990 presidential result was a disaster: the two different tickets got less than 13 percent of the vote, half of those obtained five years earlier.

The irruption of fujimorismo put the leftwing movement in tatters and there was no resurrection until the 2016 election. Fujimori succeeded in boosting economic growth and busting Sendero military power without making any concession to human rights and checks and balances. Fujimori attracted a relevant number of IU cadres for his project and built a new constituency with apparently large transfers of former leftwing supporters (Muñoz 2019, 218). At the same time, Fujimori stigmatized the Left for its inability to dissociate itself from terrorism and insurgency, a legacy that can be still observed in everyday politics in Peru (Muñoz 2019, 204).

In brief, the party system in Peru may not offer the best conditions to find robust legacies of conflict – beyond the fact that this inability was largely conditioned by the civil war and its aftermath. And still, the so-called Peruvian “conservative archipelago” (Vergara and

Encinas 2019) has shown a stubborn tendency to electorally endorse Fujimori's party vehicles. Some authors have claimed that Keiko Fujimori's 2016 electoral success was driven by a combination of leadership and strong campaigning, together with an alleged legacy of successful recipes to deal with crime and poverty (Dargent and Muñoz 2016). In the next section I try to add to this discussion by empirically investigating whether the geographical distribution of the vote shares of the three main front-runners systematically correlate with legacies of the internal conflict.

Data sources and results

To investigate whether electoral patterns in 2016 were somehow determined by previous local experiences of violence I have built an original dataset with pieces of information from different sources. The data are cross-sectional, and the unit of observation is the district (there are 1,835 districts in Peru).

The dependent variables are vote shares for the three largest parties: Keiko's *Fuerza Popular*, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's own electoral instrument, *Peruanos por el Cambio*, and the leftwing platform called *Frente Amplio*. The numbers were collected online from the Oficina Nacional de Procesos Electorales (ONPE).

I created two indicators for contemporary local poverty and crime from data gathered by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Información (INEI). The poverty rate was computed following the procedure developed by INEI for the 2013 Mapa de la Pobreza (Poverty Map). In turn, the per capita homicide rate was calculated from the 2016 Registro Nacional de Delitos y Faltas. Population size in 2015 also comes from INEI (all this information is available at the INEI database). Moreover, geographic data – district size, distance to provincial capital, and capital cities – are compiled from georeferenced district-level maps.

The second battery of independent variables looks at prewar determinants. I included a measure of how much land was locally redistributed during the revolutionary government (data come from Guardado 2018). The expectation is that districts with more redistribution may have produced more land owners willing to endorse less radical policies. I also include a dummy indicating whether the district has the official recognition of a peasant community (data come from the Instituto del Bien Común and can be downloaded at its website). This

recognition usually involves a record of local protest that may have produced a more leftwing district.

A third prewar indicator is critical: the share of Spanish speakers in the district as of the 1980 Census. This approaches very finely the presence and capacity of the state, as learning Spanish was for a long time the main elites' assimilationist dream (Cotler 2013). In order to have loyal Peruvians, local dwellers in non-Spanish-speaking communities should learn the "national" language. Low numbers of Spanish speakers therefore can be considered as a perfect fit for local weakness of state institutions, which is the breeding ground for political exclusion and a larger propensity to support the insurgency and vote for leftwing options.

The fourth prewar indicator tracks the vote share for APRA in 1966 -- the last district-level election held before the military takeover (Incio and Gil 2016). As APRA still had a sort of centrist-left leaning by that time, the idea here is to see whether there is some resemblance between districts with more APRA support in the late 1960s and contemporary voting patterns. Given that the birth of the modern leftwing movement took off during the 1970s, it would have been more correct to control for the 1978 Constitutional election.

Unfortunately, the seats for the 1978 election were allocated at the national level with a PR rule, and results are only reported by province, not district. Nonetheless, the correlation at the provincial level between 1978 and 2016 leftwing party shares is still very small (p -pearson = 0.08), so the lack of these data may not introduce strong biases into the analysis.

Finally, I have built four indicators to measure the dynamics of violence during the Peruvian civil war. With data from the CVR statistical annex, I added the number of civilians killed by Sendero Luminoso in every district (rebel violence), as well as the number of people killed by security forces in every district (state repression). One would expect that rebel violence would move voters away from leftwing options, whereas state repression would produce the opposite result.

Second, I built two indicators for rebel presence during the conflict by counting the number of years a district remained under rebel control or as a contested district. Other authors have already used the capacity of Sendero to boycott the municipal elections as a fine-grained indicator of rebel presence (De la Calle 2015b, 2017; McClintock 1998).

Given that voting is compulsory in Peru, the state as much as the rebels had a propensity to show their strength by forcing people to either vote or boycott the election. I customize Kalyvas' five-zone control range (2006) by selecting three areas: those under safe state control, those under contested authority, and those under rebel control. In districts where elections were held safe and most voters cast a valid ballot, I consider the state was in full control (this represents well the Lima metro area and the major provincial cities). In districts where the election was held, but the number of spoiled ballots was above 50 percent, I consider there is a contested situation: the state is strong enough to force local dwellers to vote, but Sendero is also strong enough as to encourage them to cast spoiled ballots. The third and final scenario portrays districts where people did not show up to vote – out of fear or ideological affinity.

With this approach to control, I measured the number of years (between 1980 and 1995) that a district had been under contested and rebel control. I use continuous measures, and also dichotomous measures with dummies identifying whether the district was at some point over the time period under contested authority or rebel control.

Table 1 reports the main results. These are OLS models with standard errors clustered at the *departamento* level to control for regional effects. Model 1 includes the continuous measures of control, whereas Model 2 instead looks at dummy measures of control.

The contemporary indicators do not seem to have much traction. Keiko gets more votes in districts with more homicides, but this result is not statistically significant. She did better in more affluent districts. Poorer districts voted in larger numbers for the FA candidate, although this result is also weak. More substantially, the share of Spanish speakers in the district in 1980 shows a remarkable pattern: a positive link with Keiko and Kuczynski, and a negative one with Verónica Mendoza. In other words, it would seem that leftwing voting in 2016 was really embedded in long-term patterns of political exclusion and economic poverty. That may be in line with the fact that the Peruvian economic miracle of the last three decades have done little to strengthen state capacity (Dargent, Feldmann and Luna 2017).

That said, it is interesting to observe that this strong effect does not wash away the legacy of violence. Whereas rebel violence encourages voting for fujimorismo, state repression has

the opposite effect – favoring the candidacy of Mendoza. Tellingly, Kuczynski's constituency does not have a systematic link to more aggrieved local populations – either with the rebels or the state. Unlike Weintraub, Vargas and Flores (2015), I did not find any systematic non-linear relationship between the intensity of violence and electoral patterns (results not included here).

The dynamics of control do offer a statistically significant impact on voting – but on Keiko's vote share, not on the Left's. Although both parties show a positive effect of rebel control on electoral support, it is only Keiko who reaped a statistically significant advantage in these districts. Given that Sendero Luminoso did little in terms of producing local public outcomes, this may explain why the main legacies of violence are driven by victimization, rather than by governance.

Finally, the FA did better in peasant districts, but worse in districts with larger APRA support in the late 60s – witnessing how the modern Left was really built during the revolutionary government and afterwards. Fujimorismo attracted some of this centrist-Left old tradition. In turn, PPK outperformed the other candidates in cities and larger populations. Kuczynski's lack of grassroots somehow anticipated his quick demise from the presidency after less than two years in office.

Table 1. Determinants of voting patterns in the first round of the Presidential election in 2016.

	(1)	(1)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(2)
	KEIKO	FA	PPK	KEIKO	FA	PPK
Homicides pc 2016	0.0461 (0.75)	-0.0731 (-1.28)	0.0136 (0.49)	0.0288 (0.45)	-0.0768 (-1.25)	0.0142 (0.52)
Poverty rate 2013	-0.178** (-3.00)	-0.0319 (-0.90)	-0.124*** (-6.00)	-0.175** (-2.89)	-0.0266 (-0.71)	-0.124*** (-6.05)
Spanish	0.168*** (4.03)	-0.219*** (-5.30)	0.0348* (2.70)	0.164*** (4.11)	-0.224*** (-5.73)	0.0353* (2.77)
Sendero killings	0.070* (1.96)	-0.0365 (-1.67)	-0.00594 (-0.96)	0.074* (1.98)	-0.0318 (-1.49)	-0.00630 (-0.94)
State killings	-0.0495 (-1.39)	0.102** (3.62)	0.00392 (0.88)	-0.0483 (-1.36)	0.102** (3.74)	0.00363 (0.79)
Full rebel control	12.66** (3.63)	3.269 (0.68)	-0.550 (-0.31)			
Rebel control (dummy)				3.544** (3.37)	0.294 (0.24)	-0.0458 (-0.08)
Contested control	2.591 (0.69)	1.664 (0.50)	-0.774 (-0.88)			
Contested (dummy)				0.609 (0.46)	-0.337 (-0.42)	-0.246 (-0.90)
Peasant district	2.194 (1.58)	1.558 (1.56)	-0.855 (-0.87)	2.153 (1.55)	1.719 (1.72)	-0.854 (-0.88)
Apra voting 1966	1.812 (1.91)	-2.099* (-2.58)	-0.0516 (-0.19)	1.783 (1.90)	-2.063* (-2.54)	-0.0589 (-0.22)
Land reform	3.966* (2.17)	-1.517 (-1.15)	-2.206 (-1.52)	3.899* (2.10)	-1.622 (-1.26)	-2.189 (-1.52)
Cities	-0.185 (-0.10)	-3.933** (-2.91)	5.750** (3.39)	-0.311 (-0.17)	-3.897** (-2.94)	5.751** (3.41)
Distance to capital	0.0965**	-0.0830**	0.0262	0.0950**	-0.0829**	0.0262

	(3.66)	(-3.55)	(1.52)	(3.57)	(-3.59)	(1.52)
Size of district	-0.0215	0.549	-1.264**	-0.00437	0.551	-1.263**
	(-0.07)	(1.51)	(-3.01)	(-0.01)	(1.52)	(-3.02)
2015 population (ln)	-1.146	-0.884	0.583*	-1.164	-0.970	0.587*
	(-1.94)	(-1.54)	(2.35)	(-1.98)	(-1.74)	(2.39)
Constant	32.98***	43.40***	12.94***	33.25***	44.61***	12.87***
	(4.69)	(4.88)	(5.32)	(4.90)	(5.23)	(5.08)
R2	0.31	0.53	0.49	0.31	0.53	0.49
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	1573	1573	1573	1573	1573	1573

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 1 compares the marginal effects of the independent variables over voting patterns by candidate. It nicely helps visualize how the effects of prewar variables (such as Spanish speakers, land reform and APRA voting) run in different directions for the main three parties. It is worth noting the strong impact of state capacity on contemporary patterns of voting in Peru, with less assimilated districts in 1980 still voting in larger numbers for leftwing options. Figure 1 also shows some convergence between fujimorismo and the Left, as they both seem to do well in areas with robust rebel presence. But the opposite impact of state repression and Sendero violence points to different ideological loyalties cemented in the aftermath of the civil war.




Figure 1. Predictive effects over vote shares in the first round of the 2016 presidential election

Table 2. Determinants of voting patterns, with interaction.

	(1) Keiko	(2) FA	(3) PPK
Sendero killings	0.0731** (2.68)	-0.0350 (-1.48)	-0.00709 (-1.60)
State killings	-0.0486* (-2.32)	0.101** (2.99)	0.00329 (0.59)
Contested (dummy)	0.625 (0.88)	-0.262 (-0.45)	-0.228 (-0.91)
Rebel control (dummy)	2.347 (1.38)	-5.094*** (-3.86)	-1.342 (-1.59)
Poverty	-0.182*** (-9.87)	-0.0591*** (-4.41)	-0.132*** (-15.70)
Control*poverty	0.0252 (0.78)	0.114*** (4.39)	0.0273 (1.80)
Peasant district	2.223** (3.00)	2.032*** (3.76)	-0.779* (-2.40)
Spanish in 1980	0.165*** (18.16)	-0.221*** (-28.43)	0.0361*** (11.54)
Homicide rate	0.0289 (0.45)	-0.0768 (-1.05)	0.0142 (0.60)
Apra vote in 1966	1.803** (2.69)	-1.975*** (-3.59)	-0.0376 (-0.15)
Land reform	3.948** (2.63)	-1.405 (-1.04)	-2.136** (-2.73)
Cities	-0.341 (-0.29)	-4.033*** (-4.25)	5.718*** (7.80)
Distance to capital	0.0953*** (4.38)	-0.0815*** (-4.74)	0.0265** (2.75)
District size	0.00285 (0.01)	0.583** (3.24)	-1.255*** (-7.79)
2015 pop (ln)	-1.175*** (-4.46)	-1.019*** (-4.89)	0.575*** (4.63)
Constant	33.49*** (11.91)	45.68*** (19.94)	13.13*** (11.33)
Observations	1573	1573	1573
Adjusted R^2	0.304	0.528	0.488

t statistics in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$


To make sure that the dynamics of control have not impact on leftwing voting, I interact in Table 2 the contemporary rate of poverty with the dichotomous indicator of rebel control (whether the district was, at some point during the conflict, under rebel control). In doing

so, I try to rule out whether the effect of rebel control over leftwing voting may be stronger for poorer districts. The interactions offer some interesting results.

The main finding is that rebel control does have a positive and statistically significant impact on the Left when interacted with levels of poverty. This means that in districts with large poverty rates (say 60 percent, a one-standard deviation from the mean), a legacy of rebel control does increase the support for the FA in little more than five percentage points, compared to districts with similar levels of poverty but no rebel control (see Figure 2).

Interestingly, this link does not work for the two other candidates.

Figure 2. Support for Frente Amplio depending on poverty and control



This finding deserves further research with a matching strategy that test its robustness. I use both the nearest-neighbor and the regression adjustment matching estimators for calculating the average treatment effect (ATE) of experiencing some measure of rebel presence over vote shares for the three main electoral contenders. I control for contemporary rates of crime and poverty, as well as for levels of prewar assimilation (the number of Spanish

speakers in the district as of the 1980 Census). My two treatments are rebel control and contested control, both in their dichotomous renditions.

Table 3 reports the ATE coefficients. If we match observations on covariates such as crime, poverty and prewar assimilation, the effect of rebel control is very robustly significant for Keiko. On average, fujimorismo captured around 3 more electoral points in districts where Sendero seized territory compared to those without control, and around 2 more points in districts with contested authority during the civil war.

Table 3. Average treatment effects of regression adjustment (RA) and nearest-neighbor matching (NNM) estimations.

treatment	Keiko		Frente Amplio		PPK	
	RA	NNM	RA	NNM	RA	NNM
rebel control (dummy)	4.41***	2.98***	0.94†	0.71	-1.0***	-0.29
contested control (dummy)	2.53***	2.20***	0.54	0.5	-0.66**	-0.82**

Note: *** significant at 0.001%; ** significant at 0.05%; † significant at 0.1%.

In contrast, the Left does not show much difference between districts with direct war experience and those without. This would imply that the effect presented in Figure 2 could be driven by assimilation: districts with low knowledge of Spanish in 1980 were poorer, more war-prone, and inevitably less affluent today.

Finally, the winner of the election, Kuczynski, fared significantly worse in war-ridden districts, although the effect is small. This goes well with the previous finding that he did better in populated districts, which remained less affected by the conflict.

Mechanisms and discussion

My analysis of electoral patterns in the 2016 presidential election in Peru has shown that, even after controlling for both long-term and short-term factors, the civil war that Peru endured during the 1980s and 1990s also have also left a mark on the electoral landscape. Some traces are more intuitive, such as the connection between fujimorismo and rebel violence, but others have been largely neglected, such as the legacy of state repression and the apparent impact of rebel control on districts with large poverty rates. Given that Sendero did little in terms of public goods production, this would imply that the civil war

legacies may be driven by victimization rather than by a positive memory of rebel control. I use in this final section survey data to complement the previous analysis with individual information. My goal is to search the potential connections between spatial factors and individual experiences of civil war.

To analyze the potential legacies of civil war over voters' preferences for the 2016 front-runners, I would need to have a survey with the standard battery of socioeconomic items (age, sex, evaluation of economic performance, ideological self-placement, and the like) plus critical questions about war-induced experiences. To the best of my knowledge, this survey does not exist.

What is available is the 2016/17 Latin American Public Opinion Project (Lapop) survey, which was administered from February to April 2017 (around a year after the first round of the presidential election). Although Lapop did not ask respondents about their experiences of victimization during the conflict, we can very indirectly approach this issue by investigating whether we find substantively different patterns of support for Keiko Fujimori and Verónica Mendoza conditional on how many people live in the district. The rationale is that population size could work as a proxy for both rebel presence during the conflict and persistence of civil war legacies through victimization afterwards. Rebel presence was more common in small towns, where lack of military infrastructure allowed Sendero to seize territory. In larger towns, Sendero was forced to operate clandestinely, with a more artificial link to the local population. Moreover, small towns usually display lower population inflows, which help maintain the memory of past traumatic events. Therefore, my analysis checks whether Keiko's and Verónica's voters show a different profile in small towns and whether this difference can be somehow traced back to the civil war period.

To run this arguably weak test, I rely on some questions included in Lapop. The two dependent variables are voting for Keiko Fujimori and Verónica Mendoza in the first round of the 2016 presidential election (question # *vb3n* in the questionnaire). 37.8 percent of the sample recognized to have voted for Keiko, 9.8 percent for Verónica and 38.6 percent for PPK. As the last two numbers stand quite far from the first-round results (recall that Verónica Mendoza collected 19 percent and PPK 21 percent), this would suggest that many respondents understood the question in terms of the second-round, where these two

candidates competed against each other and PPK carried the presidency. In this sense, leftwing voting is clearly underreported. I do not include PPK in this final analysis because both his aggregate and survey results indicate that he polled weakly in small towns and with no meaningful connection with civil war experiences.

I control for several factors that are standard in the electoral behavior literature: economic performance of the incumbent during the last year (*soct2*), ideology (*li*), whether the biggest problem for the respondent is crime or corruption (*a4*), and the gender (*q1*), age (*q2*), and education (*ed*) of the respondent. I also include an indicator of interpersonal trust (how much trustable people in your community are; *it1*) and another one for trust in the armed forces (*b12*).

Regarding exposure variables, I created a variable for whether the respondent experienced during his life discrimination at school, work, and public place, and committed by police officials and public servants. I dichotomize this variable with a positive value denoting that the respondent suffered at least one of these sources of discrimination (*dis7a-dis11a*). As there is no discrimination inflicted by non-state armed groups in the question, one would expect that potential Keiko voters should display a negative impact of this factor, whereas leftwing voters should have a negative effect, more so in historically marginalized areas. Finally, I measure the self-declared ethnic identity of the respondent. I created two dummies, one for those recognizing to have an indigenous identity (Quechua, Aymara or Amazonian), and another one for those identifying themselves as “White” (the base category being “Mestizo”; item *etid*). My expectation is that collective targeting by the military during the conflict helped cement a memory of ethnicity-driven identity that moves citizens towards the Left. As most targeting took place in rural communities, this effect should be stronger in small towns.

Table 4 includes models for three types of localities: small towns (less than 25,000 inhabitants), large towns (between 25,000 and 100,000 inhabitants), and cities (larger than 100,000 inhabitants). The findings indicate remarkable differences among candidates and between localities. In general, Keiko voters are driven by poor economic performance, are less educated on average and middle aged (with the cut point around 40 years old). Keiko voters in cities are more ideologically motivated. They do not seem to be very worried

about corruption – not a surprising finding, given that Alberto Fujimori himself was accused of widespread corruption during his tenure. In contrast, Keiko voters in small towns focus more on crime, do not care about ideology, have fewer experiences of discrimination, trust more on the armed forces, and see themselves as non-indigenous.

The larger focus of Keiko voters on crime in small towns is intriguing, as only 26 percent declared to have been victim of a crime during the last twelve months – compared to 32 percent in medium-size towns and 36 percent in cities. The literature on fear of crime has repeatedly found that cities report larger percentages of fearful citizens, more commonly because they also experience greater rates of crime (Clemente and Kleiman 1977; Hale 1996). Therefore, my finding may be driven by more salient perceptions about law-breaching behavior in areas that were heavily affected during the civil war. Moreover, the higher reliance on the armed forces of Keiko voters in small towns could also be a legacy of the conflict, as they played a key role in defeating Sendero in the countryside. Their reluctance to bear indigenous identifiers, despite the fact that indigenous self-identification is substantially concentrated in small towns, speaks to an effort to detach themselves from the marks of the losing side, being ethnicity a key driver of support for Sendero – even if for this group class always trumpeted ethnicity.

In addition to be more educated, Verónica's voters share their ethnic identity and a sort of ideological affinity (although this last trait is not significant for large towns). Remarkably, FA's voters in small towns put less weight on ideology and more on identity than those living in larger localities. They also manifest a lower propensity to rely on the armed forces, and would ethnic self-identification be not included in the model, they also claim to have suffered more experiences of discrimination, a factor that is not significant for larger localities.

Table 4. Logit models of voting for Keiko Fujimori and Verónica Mendoza in 2016.

	(1) Keiko cities	(2) Keiko large towns	(3) Keiko small towns	(4) Verónica small towns	(5) Verónica large towns	(6) Verónica cities
Economic evaluation	0.401** (3.00)	0.375* (2.09)	0.290* (2.55)	-0.119 (-0.64)	-0.217 (-0.75)	-0.229 (-0.94)
Biggest problem: crime	-0.167 (-0.89)	0.039 (0.15)	0.581*** (3.32)	-0.319 (-0.95)	-0.832 (-1.38)	-0.226 (-0.58)
Big. problem: corruption	-0.647** (-3.00)	-0.611* (-2.09)	-0.243 (-1.26)	0.612* (2.33)	-0.404 (-0.84)	0.377 (1.14)
Gender	-0.008 (-0.05)	0.156 (0.68)	0.154 (1.06)	-0.083 (-0.36)	-0.307 (-0.76)	-0.403 (-1.38)
Years of schooling	-0.072** (-2.77)	-0.058* (-2.09)	-0.067*** (-3.54)	0.061* (2.01)	0.053 (1.02)	0.096 ^x (1.80)
Age	0.075** (2.74)	0.001 (0.02)	0.067* (2.42)	0.074 ^x (1.69)	0.094 (0.86)	0.104 ^x (1.90)
Age squared	-0.001** (-2.67)	-0.0001 (-0.27)	-0.001* (-2.36)	-0.001 (-1.47)	-0.001 (-0.88)	-0.001 (-1.64)
Discrimination	-0.245 (-1.27)	0.198 (0.70)	-0.280 (-1.60)	0.345 (1.40)	-0.048 (-0.11)	0.197 (0.67)
Interpersonal distrust	0.155 (1.59)	0.173 (1.36)	0.012 (0.16)	0.125 (1.00)	0.011 (0.06)	-0.002 (-0.01)
Trust in armed forces	0.060 (1.16)	0.090 (1.33)	0.081 ^x (1.81)	-0.109 ^x (-1.67)	-0.066 (-0.70)	-0.06 (-0.60)
Ideology	0.088* (2.54)	0.009 (0.21)	-0.028 (-1.08)	-0.076 ^x (-1.72)	-0.042 (-0.58)	-0.204** (-2.58)
Indigenous identity	-0.407 (-1.43)	-0.665 ^x (-1.94)	-0.665*** (-3.46)	0.719** (2.86)	0.933* (2.14)	0.770* (2.07)
White identity	0.091 (0.36)	-0.265 (-0.80)	-0.297 (-1.27)	0.047 (0.11)	-1.429 (-1.33)	-1.068 (-1.41)
Constant	-3.227*** (-3.89)	-1.815 (-1.62)	-2.420** (-3.09)	-3.994*** (-3.35)	-3.207 (-1.58)	-3.939* (-1.97)
R2	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.10
p	0.000	0.004	0.000	0.000	0.166	0.001
N	813	468	1062	1062	468	813

t statistics in parentheses

^x $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2016/17
www.LapopSurveys.org.

In general, these findings point to a deep local cleavage in small towns between those voting for fujimorismo, with fewer grievances against the state, less prone to indigenous identities, and more reliant on the military, and those voting for FA, who suffered more discrimination, tend to identify themselves as indigenous and manifested a lower support for the army.

The story of the impact of the Peruvian civil war over contemporary electoral outcomes is one of victimization legacies, in line with previous research (see Balcells 2012).

Fujimorismo was able to carve out a new constituency out of its economic and military successes, but in the areas mostly affected by the conflict, its attraction was also driven by the local dynamics of conflict, such as rebel presence and targeting. More surprisingly, I also found that state repression helps harden local constituencies in favor of leftwing parties, as long as those parties run together and field likeable candidates. This effect was more robust in small localities, where much of the conflict took place. Thus, my findings support my first expectation (that targeting imposes a legacy on party preferences), but less so the second one (that rebel presence should positively correlate with leftwing voting). Compared to the Partisans in Italy or the FMLN in El Salvador, the failure of the Left to draw on rebel networks built during the war is driven by Sendero's lack of public goods production during wartime, as well as its brutal targeting pattern. But the sheer defeat of Sendero, and its following demonizing from the public discourse, also contributed to turning the Left into electoral oblivion for decades.

Victimization, therefore, explains this double-bind legacy I have found for Peruvian politics. Rebel groups whose armed strategy funnels their resources mainly to the military offensive rather than to institution building in the rearguard, may apparently leave little trace behind, once wiped out. However, counter-insurgent policies should factor in that the use of indiscriminate techniques to win the war at any cost may build strong, enduring pro-government constituencies (the victory bonus), but also feed aggrieved populations with appetite for anti-regime parties, if given the opportunity to vote. Sendero Luminoso's path of blood and fanaticism, such as the Islamic State's path today, ended in military defeat, political discredit and electoral oblivion. But the cost of its downfall left a legacy that has partially fed anti-establishment political options in contemporary Peru. This may also be the apparently inevitable cost of routing the Islamic State in Iraq and other countries with elections where the group has operated.

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